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TRUST-FUND DOCTRINE REVISITED
PART I
JAMES R. ELLIS* AND CHARLES L. SAYREt
F OR MORE THAN HALF a century the critics have been hammering at
the trust-fund theory of corporate assets.' The result of this effort
has not been destruction.' The body of rules once termed "the most
important"8 in the law of corporations remains a significant legal
structure, reshaped and redefined. A vast majority of the American
courts, state and federal, have adhered to the doctrine at one time or
another,' and no jurisdiction followed it more consistently or extended
it further than Washington.' We feel it worthwhile to examine the
recent developments and appraise the current condition of this corner
of the law, although it requires a further pass at a much covered target.
The doctrine had its genesis in the oft-quoted opinion of Justice
Storey in Wood v. Dummer" wherein the emnent jurist laid it down
that the assets of an insolvent corporation were a trust fund for the
benefit of its creditors. A scholarly judge has noted that this utterance
of the rule was a deliberate innovation by Story under circumstances
where he could have adequately solved the case before him on estab-
lished rules.' Be this as it may, impetus was given to a distinct rationale
for the treatment of creditors' claims against insolvent corporate
debtors, which had far-reaching effect.
*L.L.B., University of Washington, 1948, associated with the law firm of Preston,
Thorgrimson, and Horowitz, Seattle.
tL.L.B., University of Washington, 1948.
1 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 348, 349 (Rev. ed. 1946), Hunt, The Trust Fund
Theory and Some Substitutes for It, 12 YALE L. J. 63, Wickersham, The Capital of a
CorporationI, 22 HARV. L. REV. 319; 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES § 596 (Rev. ed. 1940), Zettler, The Trust Fund Theory: A Study in
Psychology, 1 WASH. L. REV. 81, POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1046 (4th ed.)
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 185 (1936) , 15A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 7369 (Perm. ed.).
2 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 185 (1936)
3 WAIT, INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS § 142, 119 (1888).
4 See 15A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7369 et seq. (Perm.
ed.) and state-by-state coverage of cases therein.
5 Williams v. Davidson, 104 Wash. 315, 176 Pac. 334 (1918), stating at 104 Wash.
320 that the trust fund doctrine had been "followed in an unbroken line of decisions. So
that if anything may be said to be settled, this doctrine has become the settled law of
this state", Sterrett v. White Pine Sash Co., 176 Wash. 663, 30 P. (2d) 665 (1934).
6 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 944 (1824).
- Mitchell, J. in Hospes v. Northwestern Manufacturing and Car Co., 48 Minn. 174,
50 N.W 1117 (1892).
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Most of the able courts applying the doctrine were quick to concede
that the analogy to true trust was at best imperfect.8 But in the legis-
lative vacuum in which the great depressions of the late nineteenth
century occurred, the doctrine offered an effective method of providing
fair treatment for general corporate creditors, and of preventing a dis-
ordered scramble for assets on a "first come, first served" basis. The
expansion of the doctrine in this period has been aptly described as
sorely needed "judicial legislation." 9 Certainly in fairness it can not be
said that the adoption of the trust fund rationale was a judicial acci-
dent perpetuated by stare decisis.
The foundation case in Amenca" was an action to restore dividends
paid out to shareholders by an insolvent bank, but from limited begin-
nings the trust-fund doctrine expanded to become a major legal weapon
for corporate creditors under a wide variety of conditions. In this dis-
cussion we propose to treat separately three major aspects of the trust-
fund problem: (i) the status of corporate insolvency, which was a
condition precedent to the operation of the rule; (2) the rights of
creditors against creditors; and (3) the rights of creditors against
shareholders. Our analysis will be confined chiefly to the statutory and
case law of the state of Washington with no attempt at detailed treat-
ment of the rules of other courts beyond an incidental comparison.
The Federal Bankruptcy Act is excluded from analytical discussion as
deserving separate treatment. We undertake no more in that regard
than to point out to the practitioner the possibility of using substantive
state law to advantage in proceedings under the Federal Act.1 The
body of case authority will be appraised in the light of the various state
statutes which apply, and an attempt made to indicate the current
place of the trust-fund doctrine in this jurisdiction.
INSOLVENCY
For reasons which are quite apparent, the trust-fund doctrine had
no application until a corporation had become insolvent.2 It is fitting
that the discussion of the doctrine itself be prefaced by a definitive
treatment of that financial state of affairs which invoked its operation.
8 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 14 S. Ct. 127 (1893), Bates
v. Brooks, 22 Iowa 1128, 270 N.W 867 (1937), Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 39
Pac. 166 (1895).
9 Zettler, The Trust Fund Theory: A Study ti Psychology, 1 WAsH. L. REV. 81,
85 (1925).
10 Note 6 supra.
112 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 597, 1030 (Rev. ed.).
12 15A FLETcHER, CyCLOPEDrA OF PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNS § 7386 (Pern. ed.).
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As far as preferences to creditors were concerned, attractive argu-
ments have been made to the effect that there should be a distinction
drawn between preferences given by corporations which, though insol-
vent (in the ratio of assets to liabilities sense), were doing business in
good faith, hoping eventually to extricate themselves from financial
embarrassment, and those which dealt with an eye to pending disso-
lution.18 The Washington court, however, did not choose to make a
judicial distinction but, rather, settled upon a definition which would
apply to all cases, to wit: a corporation was "insolvent" when it was
unable to pay its debts "in due course of business." 1' A corporation
may be insolvent even though the reasonable value of its assets exceeds
the amount of its liabilities. 5 Inherent difficulties in this latter propo-
sition became apparent with the adoption of the 1941 preference act1
wherein preferences were defined as transactions which, "at the time
made," enabled a creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than other creditors of the same class. This, of course, would be
mathematically impossible if the realizable value of the corporate
assets exceeds its liabilities.
Be that as it may, statutory definition is not lacking modernly The
Uniform Business Corporation Act,s adopted in Washington in 1933,
states that a petition for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation
may be entertained by the court where it is shown that "the corporate
assets are insufficient to pay all the just demands for which the cor-
poration is liable or to afford reasonable security to those who may
deal with it."' 9 The word "insolvency" nowhere appears in that section,
however. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,2 0 adopted in
Washington in 1945, undertakes specifically to define insolvency as
existing "when the present fair salable value of assets is less than
the amount that will be required to pay probable liability on
existing debts as they become absolute and matured."'" The discrep-
18 1 WASH. L. REv. 81, 92.
14 Ronald v. Schoenfeld, 94 Wash. 238, 162 Pac. 43 (1917), Simpson v. Western
Metal & Hardware Co., 97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113 (1917), Brooks v. Parsons Co.,
124 Wash. 300, 214 Pac. 6 (1923), Guaranty Trust Co. v. Yakima First National
Bank, 179 Wash. 615, 38 P. (2d) 384 (1934), Strang v. Puget Sound National Bank,
188 Wash. 503, 63 P.(2d) 373 (1936).
11 Simpson v. Western Metal & Hardware Co., Brooks v. Parsons Co., note 14
supra. Though the court in each case expressed doubt that the facts were as found.
16 REM. REV. STAT. (1941 Supp.) 5831-4 et seq., Wash. Laws 1945 c. 103.
17 Id. Subsection 4(c). (Emphasis added.)
18 REi. REV. STAT. § 3803-1 et seq.
19 Id. Subsection 50.
20 REM. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 6854-40 et. seq. Wash. Laws 1945 c. 136.
21 Id. Subsection 41 (1). The UFCA applies to corporations ("persons").
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ancy, if there be any of substantial importance, would appear to be
more the result of the blanket nature of uniform act adoptions than
from any real need for a different definition in each instance. A
statute of somewhat ancient origin authorizes the appointment of a
receiver when a corporation is "insolvent" or is in danger of becoming
SO.22 The recent case of Warren v. Porter Construction Co.2 indicates
that this statute is in current use and holds that the due course of
business test is determinative of the existence of insolvency in pro-
ceedings under that statute. Any potential inconsistencies in the later
statutory definitions were not discussed in the opimon. Without antici-
pating possible conflict in application, the desirability of having a
single concept and definition is apparent.
CREDITOR AGAINST CREDITOR
THE "EQUALITY" DOCTRINE
In the normal course of business, no creditor is greatly concerned
when the claim of another creditor is paid off by the common debtor.
But, when such payment is made under conditions which render it less
likely that other creditors will be paid, the hue and cry of "preference"
is heard if it ultimately devolves in liquidation that there are not suffi-
cient assets to meet all liabilities. Interestingly enough, the common
law attached no stigma to preferences given by individual as contrasted
with corporate debtors and, to this date, under our state law, they are
not recoverable."' Yet, with regard to preferences given by insolvent
corporations, a separate field of law has been erected upon the founda-
tion statement that the assets of an insolvent corporation are a trust
fund for all its creditors. The explanations given for this phenomenon
are (i) a corporation has a greater repertoire of "tricks" than an
individual debtor25 and (2) it has, as a rule, a larger area of operation
in the geographic sense so that those creditors farther away from the
core of operation are at a disadvantage to observe the financial status
of the company 28 The history of the judicial ideal that there should
be equality in distributing the assets of an insolvent corporation has
22 R . REv STAT. § 741(5). The provision is substantially the same as that con-
tained in the Laws of Wash., Civil Practice (1854) § 171(5), and in CODE PRoC. 1881,§ 193 (5).22 29 Wn. (2d) 785, 189 P. (2d) 255 (1948).
24 Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co., 4 Wash. 600, 30 Pac. 741 (1892), Holt Mfg.
Co. v. Bennington, 73 Wash. 467, 132 Pac. 30 (1913), Tomlinson v. Burgess, 185
Wash. 33, 52 P.(2d) 1259 (1935).25 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, § 596 (Rev. ed.).
28 1 WASH. L. REV. 81, 82.
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been adequately discussed elsewhere.2" The object of our discussion
here is to set out various aspects of the law of preferences as they
crystallized in our common law and to attempt to evaluate their
import in light of the modern legislative inroads on this field where the
trust-fund theory so long ruled supreme.
Aside from the element of insolvency, there is no reason to believe
that the Washington court ever entertained a concept of preferences
different from that which was adopted by way of definition in the
federal bankruptcy legislation of 1898, in substance, a preference was
a course of dealing between an insolvent corporation and one of its
creditors which enabled the latter to obtain a larger percentage of his
debt than other creditors of the same class. 28
Since the trust-fund doctrine had as its aim an equality of distri-
bution of the assets of an insolvent corporation, it would seem to
follow that the remedy in equity to have a preference set aside could
only be accomplished as an incident of liquidation proceedings where
the machinery was at hand to effect efficiently and impartially such a
distribution. From earliest statehood Washington has had a statute
authorizing the appointment of a receiver for insolvent corporations.29
Early cases which invoked the trust-fund doctrine did so with that
statute as a logical starting point.8 Granting the need for equality of
distribution, the agent for its effectuation was tailor-made. Also the
remedy of having a receiver appointed appears always to have been
available to simple contract creditors, if their claims were not contro-
verted, upon a mere showing that the corporation was insolvent. 1 The
advantages were obvious; time and expense involved in bringing a
claim to judgment were avoided and the expenses of liquidation were
allocated among all creditors.
In 1933 the Uniform Business Corporations Act 2 invaded the
field of corporate receivership. Section 51 of this act provides, in part,
that a creditor whose claim has been reduced to judgment or is admit-
27 1 WASH. L. REv. 81, 82.
28 See Simpson v. Western Metal & Hardware Co., note 14 supra, at 97 Wash.
631, the court discusses discrepancy between federal and state concepts of insolvency.
29 Note 22 supra.
so Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co., note 12 supra, Oleson v. Bank of Tacoma, 15
Wash. 148, 45 Pac. 734 (1896), Express statutory authority offsets the argument that
remedy through receiver is "drastic and harsh." See, however, the dissenting opinion
in Kreide v. Independence League, 188 Wash. 376, 62 P.(2d) 1101 (1936).
81 Davis v. Consolidated Coal Co., 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22 (1906), Snyder v.
Yakima Finance Corp., 174 Wash. 499, 25 P. (2d) 108 (1933), Kreide v. Independence
League, note 30 supra.
2 Note 18 supra.
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ted by the corporation may petition for the involuntary dissolution of
such corporation on the grounds specified therein (presumably a defi-
nition of "insolvency"). Section 53 states that the court "may" appoint
a liquidating receiver upon the filing of such a petition after process
has issued against the corporation and the claims admitted by answer
or proved against it. It is interesting to note that in Kreide v. Inde-
pendence League of Amerca," the right of a judgment creditor to the
remedy of a receiver was challenged in a dissenting opinion by Judge
Blake on the ground that a judgment creditor should be required first
to exhaust his legal remedies by way of execution. Yet, just three years
prior to that case, Judge Blake had subscribed to the statement in
Snyder v. Yakzma Finance Corporation" to the effect that it was the
duty of the court to appoint a receiver of an insolvent corporation
whenever an interested party asked for the remedy and made a satis-
factory showing of insolvency 85 It should further be observed that
the Kresde case was decided three years after the adoption of the
Uniform Business Corporation Act, and without any reference thereto;
instead, the court relied upon the old receivership statute.
While, as indicated, there is some confusion on the subject, it
appears that, upon a satisfactory showing of insolvency, the appoint-
ment of a receiver will, after application therefor by a creditor, follow
as a matter of course.
THE EFFECT OF GOOD FAITH
In keeping with trust concepts, the satisfaction of a pre-existing debt
did not constitute a creditor a bona fide purchaser so as to cut off the
equities of other creditors in the assets of the insolvent corporation."0
Thus, if at the time of the satisfaction of the debt, the debtor corpora-
tion was insolvent, no amount of good faith on the part of the creditor
who was paid would prevent recovery of the preference at the suit of
the other creditors."' A similar rule would seem applicable to judg-
ment creditors, " although our court in Conover v. Hull" appeared to
83 188 Wash. 376, 62 P.(2d) 1101 (1936).
s4 Note 31 supra.8s Oleson v. Bank of Tacoma, note 30 supra; but see 23 WASH. L. REv. 60.
36 Malm v. Griffith, 109 Wash. 30, 186 Pac. 647 (1919), Thomas v. Grote-Ranlan
Co., 75 Wash. 280, 134 Pac. 919 (1913), Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn.(2d) 740, 150
P.(2d) 604 (1944).
37 Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co., note 24 supra, Sterrett v. White Pine Sash
Co., note 5 supra.
38 ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 308.1 citing Ransom v. Wickstrom, 84 Wash. 419, 146 Pac.
1041 (1915), Banks v. Morse, 17 Wn.(2d) 18, 134 P.(2d) 952 (1943).
30 10 Wash. 373, 39 Pac. 166 (1895).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
rely heavily upon the collusive nature of the judgment in setting it
aside as a preference. Recent cases, however, indicate that Washington
does not treat judgment creditors as purchasers "for value," so good
faith alone will not cut off equities."0 The statutes insofar as they deal
with judgments state that they are preferences if "procured or suf-
fered" by an insolvent corporation. The question whether these words
could be treated as synonymous with "collusive or by confession" has
not been answered in this jurisdiction. A literal interpretation of
"trust," however, would appear to make such an inquiry irrelevant.
TIME LIMITATION
Again, by analogy to trust law, the right to recover trust property
is limited by, and coextensive with, the right of the trustee. If the
statute of limitation has run against him, it has run against all others
in the absence of bad faith on the part of the transferee." None of the
early Washington cases dealt with this point concerning the setting
aside of preferences. In Peeples v. Hayes,"2 however, it was held that
the appointment of a receiver created no new cause of action and that
therefore the statute of limitation commenced to run at the time the
transfer took place regardless of when the other creditors discovered
the transaction. This was so even though the creditor had reasonable
cause to know he was receiving a preference.
THE 1931 PREFERENCE STATUTE
In 1931, the Washington Legislature enacted what was termed by
our court' the "trust fund statute" which dealt specifically with cor-
porate preferences." As construed by our court in Post v. Fischer,"
this statute enabled the receiver to recover a preference made or suf-
fered within a period of four months prior to the date of filing of the
petition for his appointment regardless of the good faith of the creditor
who received it. As to preferences made or suffered prior to the four
months' period, there must be a showing that the creditor had "reason-
able cause to believe" that a preference was thereby effected at the
time he received it. As to recovery under the latter proposition, the
Peeples case held that the normal statutes of limitation would apply
40 Banks v. Morse, note 38 supra (purchase by judgment creditor at execution sale).
41 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 327.2.
424 Wn.(2d) 253, 104 P.(2d) 305 (1940). It was not there necessary to decide
which statute of limitation applied, the court assumed that the "ordinary" statutes of
limitation were applicable.
43 Whiting v. Rubmstein, 7 Wn.(2d) 204, 109 P.(2d) 846 (1941).
44 Rm. REv. STAT. § 5831-1 et seq.
45 191 Wash. 577, 71 P.(2d) 659 (1937).
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In addition, the receiver must have commenced the suit within six
months of the filing of the petition for is appointment and this require-
ment was construed as jurisdictional.
THE 1941 PREFERENCE STATUTE4
In 1941, the so-called "trust-fund statute" was repealed and re-
placed by new legislation which used much stronger language and
imposed more stringent limitations. Under this statute, preferences
given within the four months' period of the date of filing of the peti-
tion for the appointment of a receiver may be set aside by such receiver
as a matter of law4T provided the action is brought within (and not
after) six months of the date of such filing." As far as that action is
concerned, no subjective inquiry into the good faith of either the
preferor or the preferee need ever be made. There can no longer be a
recovery of a preference made before the four months' period, "and all
provisions of law or of the trust fund doctrine permitting recovery of
any preference made beyond such four (4) months' period are hereby
specifically superseded."' 9
The ideal of equality has been to some degree preserved but has been
modified by considerations of business stability and the security of
titles.
REMEDIES OF INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS
The use of the term "trust fund," is fraught with dangers when
conceptually divorced from the "principle of equality" Since the credi-
tors, as a class, were treated as beneficiaries of the assets of an insol-
vent corporation, class rights would normally exist which could be
asserted through a creditor's bill in equity " Under the common law
such a proceeding had no advantage over the more efficient remedy
through a receiver but, on the contrary, had many unfavorable char-
acteristics as a method for recovering preferences. First, existing con-
cepts of equitable jurisdiction seemed to require that all legal remedies
be exhausted, and that would normally entail bringing the claim to
' REm. REv. STAT. (1941 Supp.) § 5831-6.
47See also 16 WASH. L. REv. 62.
48 Note 46 supra subsection 5.
40 Note 46 supra.
0 Of course, once a receiver had been appointed, no individual actions could be
maintained. Watterson v. Masterson, 15 Wash. 511, 46 Pac. 1041 (1896), Shuey v.
Adair, 24 Wash. 378, 64 Pac. 536 (1901), Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, 2
Wn.(2d) 252, 97 P.(2d) 1055 (1940).
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judgment and a return of execution unsatisfied." Secondly, courts
normally viewed such a suit as having been brought on behalf of all
the creditors, though the expenses of the suit were imposed upon the
suing creditor and those who saw fit to join with him in its prosecu-
tion. 2 In light of the foregoing, it is not at all strange that little prece-
dent exists for creditor's bills to set aside preferences. Peeples v.
Hayes" purported to shed light on what the old law mnght have been
in this regard. That case dealt with a preference given some four and a
half years before the filing of the application for the appointment of a
receiver. It being necessary, therefore, to determine when the appli-
cable statute of limitation commenced to run, the court concluded that
the cause of action arose at the time of the transfer and that, since a
receiver could have been applied for at any time thereafter, the action
was barred. The court went on to say, however "
We are not persuaded, however, that the creditors could not have brought
individual actions after the transfer had taken place, or that the remedy
through a liquidating receivership was the exclusive remedy Such action, of
course, would necessarily have been directed to enforcing a re-transfer to
the corporation, or it might have been in the nature of a creditor's bill, at
all events, an equitable proceeding, grounded upon the fact that the defend-
ants had taken, and were holding, property in which the plaintiff and all
other creditors had a trust interest.
The opinion recognized the general rule that a simple contract
creditor cannot maintain an action to set aside a "fraudulent convey-
ance" until he has reduced his claim to judgment, but stated that the
better rule, under code pleading would allow a creditor to bring an
action on his claim and ask the court to assert its equitable power to
pursue property "which could not be reached by an action at law"
The "trust interest" to which the Peeples case has reference could be
none other than that raised by the de facto insolvency of the corporate
debtor at the time of the transfer and is as strong a statement of the
trust-fund doctrine as has been encountered in the reports of any
jurisdiction. The statement by the court is even more significant in
light of the fact that it was construing, almost in the same breath, a
statute5 which might reasonably have been interpreted as placing the
515 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 2319-2321 (4th ed). See also O'Day v.
Ambaum, 47 Wash. 684, 92 Pac. 421 (1901) dealing with an insolvent partnership,
however.
52 Biehn v. Aetna Investment Co., 110 Wash. 460, 118 Pac. 489 (1920).
53 Note 42 supra.
.4 At 4 Wn. (2d) 260.
55 The 1931 preference statute, note 44 supra.
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sole cause of action in a receiver and which measured time limitations
from the same basic point used in our present day statute, vtz., the date
of filing an application for appointment of a receiver.
If the statements contained in the Peeples case are not to be treated
as ill-considered dicta, and the somewhat limited repudiation of the
trust fund doctrine contained in the 1941 statute is restricted to its
immediate context, the following hypothesis is submitted for con-
sideration:
X corporation, being then insolvent, transfers property to D, a
simple contract creditor, in satisfaction of the pre-existing debt. P, an-
other creditor, hears of the transfer five months later (too late to have
relief through the appointment of a receiver). Can P bring an action
on his claim and ask the additional euitable relief suggested in the
Peeples case that the transfer be set aside and the property reconveyed
to the corporation for the benefit of all the creditors? In any event,
P nught argue that the statutory limitation applies only to actions by
receivers and that the common law trust fund doctrine continues to
apply to creditor's bills. Far from expressly repudiating the doctrine,
our court has only recently reiterated that "the trust fund doctrine is
part of the common law of this state.""6
PREFERENCES AS FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
There is one more possibility which nght operate in favor of credi-
tors against whom the four months' limitation has run. While a prefer-
ence per se cannot be regarded as a fraudulent conveyance,5" situations
may arise where a transaction which has the effect of preferring a
creditor also is tinged with the badge of "fraud."" Attempts have been
made under the federal bankruptcy act to avoid the analogous four
months' limitation contained therein by showing that the transaction
came within other provisions of the bankruptcy act " which are sub-
stantially the same as those in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act"0 adopted in Washington in 1945. Subsection 46, of this latter
statute, renders fraudulent any conveyance made with actual intent to
"hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, and subsection 48 states that
where a conveyance is fraudulent as to a creditor, he may, as against
0 0Whittaker v. Weller, 8 Wn. (2d) 18, 111 P. (2d) 218 (1941).
57 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§' 289, 289(a) (Rev.
ed.). Holbrook, Merrill & Stetson v. Peters & Miller Co., 8 Wash. 344, 36 Pac. 256
(1894).
58 Id.50 See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 19 F Supp. 816 (S. D .N. Y. 1937).00 Note 20 upra.
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any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowl-
edge, have certain remedies,"1 the only pertinent one being the right
to have the conveyance set aside.
A brief review of the cases under the federal act indicates that a
very strong showing of fraud is required. " Not only must it be shown
that both transferor and transferee acted with specific intent to hinder,
defraud, and delay other creditors,8 but it has been intimated that
there must be a showing that the transferor acted with a purpose to
secure some advantage to himself to which the transferee was a party
It may, however, be a useful theory in the more extreme case.8
CONCLUSION
The trust-fund doctrine as it applied to corporate preferences should
be considered alive today only insofar as it has been preserved by
statute.8 The potential area for survival of trust fund theory outside
the 1941 act is narrow Our suggestion that the statutory limitations
upon a receiver's rights to set aside preferences might be strictly map-
plicable to individual creditors' suits is made to emphasize this remain-
ing uncertainty The language of the recent Whiting8 case leaves a
feeling that our court may not be receptive to this suggestion, but the
existence of such a right of action has not been definitely denied.
Except for cases involving fraud in fact (which was never in any real
sense a part of the trust-fund doctrine) logically no greater right
should exist in an individual creditor than exists in the receiver who
purports to act on his behalf.
(To be continued)
61 Note 20 supra, subsections 48, 49.
62 Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, note 59 supra, interpreting "hinder, delay or
defraud."68 And proof of insolvency at the time of transfer is inconclusive. 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY i" 67.37 (14th ed.).
641d.
6 1 in Whiting v. Seattle-First National Bank, 13 Wn.(2d) 450, 125 P.(2d) 656
(1942) it was stated that if "the transfer took place more than four months prior to
the application for appointment of a receiver, there was no preference, within the
meaning of our trust fund doctrine" (emphasis added). This would appear to be the
more sensible approach.66 Note 65 supra.
